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Abstract

This chapter introduces the concept of ethical, legal, and social issues – known as
ELSI – as it is relevant to security science research and security science-informed
practice. After deﬁning ethical, legal, and social issues, the chapter addresses
main ELSI domains and discusses how to address those in security science.
Arguments are illustrated using examples from domains such as critical infrastructure protection and novel coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) response.
Subsequently, the chapter demonstrates the relevance of ELSI analysis in security
science for risk assessment and vulnerability analysis. It argues for a comprehensive approach to ELSI assessment and consideration in security science that
actively involves members of the public in the process of exploring ethical,
legal, and social issues. Selected public participation methods are recommended.
Moreover, the chapter discusses the use of ELSI to address the security vs. liberty
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dilemma in security science and the real-world security practice that it may
inform and offers criteria for “good security science” that embeds assessing and
addressing of ELSI throughout the research and dissemination process. The
chapter concludes by arguing that security science should provide a better
connection of the disciplines involved in its research undertakings. Security
science should establish networked expertise to foster deliberate planning and
well as rapid decision support capability for crisis management.

Introduction
The addressing of ethical, legal, and social issues (known as ELSI) in security
science has gained signiﬁcant relevance in the homeland security era (Hadjimatheou
et al. 2015; Siedschlag 2017), the concept and its relevance pre-dating 9/11, though.
Consideration of ELSI aspects in security science is an element of a moral discourse
that derives from a global human security perspective and transcends national
security research ecosystems (cf. Nyman and Burke 2016). ELSI emerged from
deliberation about the interaction of technology and society in natural and life
science-oriented security research but has gained increasing relevance throughout
the entire disciplinary spectrum of security science.
ELSI as a speciﬁc concept was ﬁrst introduced in the Human Genome Project
(HGP), evaluating ethical, legal, and societal implications of the newfound genetic
knowledge (Yesley and Roth 1993). Technology assessment of the effects of new
products and processes on society and exploration of societal acceptance and ethical
acceptability of emerging technologies was then applied to ﬁelds, such as nuclear
technology, pharmacology, gene technology, or artiﬁcial intelligence, and others
(Lucivero 2016). As well, ethics aspects have traditionally been addressed in
strategic planning processes (Howe 1994). Broader applications relate ELSI to the
entire spectrum of “emergency research ethics,” addressing how the scientiﬁc study
of individuals and populations experiencing calamity can and should “protect and
promote the well-being and autonomy of research participants, researchers, science
and society as a whole [. . .], while allowing and encouraging research to take place
that will beneﬁt members of society through the production of knowledge or new
[. . .] interventions” (Selgelid and Viens 2012, p. xv).
By today, ELSI has become a universal concept used to address compliance and
societal acceptance issues in military and security science, such as unanticipated
military uses of technology and crossovers of military technological solutions to
civilian use (Chameau et al. 2014). This, for example, includes informed consent,
data protection, and risk-beneﬁt assessment for research involving human subjects;
ownership and use-to-purpose of data; potential of data to allow identiﬁcation of
individuals rather than just providing cluster information, thus supporting the right
of individual self-determination; and assessing and addressing the potential for dual
(civil and military) use and misuse (e.g., terrorist abuse) of research results. Typical
ELSI mitigation methods include self-control by researchers and professional
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associations; safeguards and codes of conduct, including addressing of wider (societal) impact of research results; institutional review and audit systems; as well as
legally rooted mechanisms, such as data protection and harmonization of terminologies and legal standards to support compliance (Rath et al. 2014).

Defining Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues
ELSI analysis is indispensable in security science because it is a predominant factor
in enabling us to ensure a sound balance between liberty and security (see Kowalski
2008). The three components of ELSI may be deﬁned as follows:
Ethical issues – Ethical issues describe the space deﬁned by the study of moral
obligation that is available to achieve coherence of security with political and
societal preferences (Selgelid and Viens 2012). That space can be broken down
into three distinct systems (Zack 2009): consequentialism focuses on achieving
action results of high moral value; deontology (or duty ethics) centers on always
adhering to certain high moral principles in all of our actions, regardless of the
speciﬁc outcome; virtue ethics are based on a moral system of common values.
Speciﬁcally, ethical issues may be best mitigated by virtue (values ethics); legal
issues by deontology; and social issues by consequentialism, focused on the actual
effects on people. However, in practice, accurate addressing of ELSI in security
science and practice will most likely be based on a combination of elements from all
three moral systems.
Legal issues – As part of ELSI, reﬂection on legal issues mainly serves to duly
consider the risk of security intrusion: encroaching of constitutionally protected civil
rights and freedoms without a proportional security payoff, thus not serving the
security of the people but infringing liberty (Kowalski 2008; Roach and Hufnagel
2012). Legal issues consideration addresses balancing of values as well as distributive justice: Security capabilities should not include as a consequence the uneven
distribution of security in society, safeguarding some parts of it more than others, or
securing some while making others more vulnerable (to hazards or an imbalance
between security and liberty). Aspects such as dual-use (Rath et al. 2014) of security
science research output and products (i.e., civilian technology applications that may
also be used for military purposes or may be exploited for criminal terrorist abuse)
demonstrate how legal aspects intertwine with other dimensions (such as ethical
aspects) along the ELSI continuum.
Social issues – Whereas ethical aspects typically relate to the moral acceptability
of security science, security technology, and security practice, social aspects often
refer to their societal acceptance (Legran and McConnell 2012). This is an important
perspective because technology not only can contribute to security but also create
new vulnerabilities. Yet the social issues component in ELSI is still broader: It also
relates to the all-hazards/whole-community approach to homeland security (Kilroy
2018) and the integrated approach to disaster resilience globally (Paton and Johnston
2017), as well as to comprehensively safeguarding and defending a society’s commonly acquired values (Wolfers 1952, p. 485).
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Important to consider in critical thinking about the response to the novel coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), the “S” in ELSI also draws attention to the evidencebased security needs of society and disaster-struck communities, as opposed to the
bureaucratic and political construction of disaster (Roberts 2013). It is indicative of
the need for more awareness of, and delivery to, ELSI that accounts of “scientiﬁc
response to COVID-19 and lessons for security” such as by Gronvall (2020)
typically fail to address ethical, legal, and social (other than “social distancing”)
aspects of pandemic response and critical thinking about the future of security
science(s). “Social distancing” is not a social but a physical matter and therefore
should be more adequately referred to as physical distancing. This term that was in
use in the public health discipline before COVID-19 (e.g., Glass et al. 2006) is a
complete misnomer as well as an example of how relevant disciplines in security
science do not interlock: For a thing to be “social,” as we have known since Max
Weber (1962), it has to be value-driven and meaning-loaden and oriented toward
others’ action, beyond mere co-orientation. If we refer to social distance, as we have
known since Emile Durkheim and Georg Simmel (Karakayali 2009), we talk about
in-grouping vs. out-grouping and trying to separate and seclude the values of one’s
own community from those of other communities. Also in times of crisis, terminology is not a luxury discourse but highly impactful on social outcomes.
The needs of all members of the whole community should be considered in the
planning and execution of any disaster response, including pandemic response
(Siedschlag 2020). Another consideration, also relatable to the COVID-19 response,
is the following:
Protecting people’s security sometimes involves limiting the freedoms of a whole population. So long as the operation of these limitations is kept as short as possible and imposed in
order to protect important rights, such as the right to life, even human rights law permits
them. Human rights law recognizes the existence of emergencies that “threaten the life of the
nation.” [The] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) recognize[s] this
kind of emergency. Anticipating that declarations of emergency might be used opportunistically by governments as justiﬁcation for the unnecessary limitation of rights, human rights
law discourages the declaration of an emergency by governments, and requires the period of
emergency to be as short as possible. Even in emergencies, certain human rights may not be
limited, according to human rights law. These include the right not to be tortured and the
right not to be discriminated against. (Hadjimatheou et al. 2015, p. 178)

Main ELSI Domains and How to Address Them in Security Science
Based on a literature review, primary domains of ELSI include the following
(Siedschlag 2017):
• Balancing liberty and security in legislation as well as in policy implementation
and disaster response
• Eternal or continuously extended emergency declarations that may ultimately run
counter constitutional and democratic principles
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• Ethical net assessment of technological and nontechnological security interventions: proportionality of the security measures related to the intended outcomes
for society in comprehensive perspective
• Potential of abuse of technological security solutions, such as exploitation by
criminals or terrorists
• Data mining and government surveillance of citizens, and the related aspects of
right to privacy and legal limitations on intelligence gathering on own citizens
• Indiscriminate subjection of large parts of society to generalized suspicion and
investigation, for example, based on proﬁling (such as racial proﬁling)
• Discriminatory security interventions that for example only mitigate risks and
serve interest speciﬁc to a certain sector of society, as opposed to the whole
community
Addressing ethical, legal, and social aspects in a way integrated into the very
security research process itself is not only a requirement for good research. It also is
of prior importance for the public perception of security science, its integrity, its
discoveries and recommendations, and its overall impact on society, such as the
creation of social asymmetry (Suchman et al. 2017). ELSI analysis thus contributes
to the social legitimacy of that type of research, and society’s acceptance and use of
its results and products.
Conceptions of risk, security, and solutions to security problems vary according
to the organization of political and social relations. Risks and security threats are
selected as important because they reinforce established interpretations and relations
within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community:
“Common values lead to common fears [. . .]. There is no gap between perception
and reality” (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p. 8). In other words, there is no risk “out
there,” but risk is always selected from within a society, based on cultural backgrounds. This means following this interpretation that risk is a “social construct” and
cannot be assessed against a (mistaken) “objective” or “factual” notion of the
concept. This is where the concept of security culture comes in and can provide
important guidance on addressing ELSI in security science.
Security culture (Siedschlag and Jerković 2018) is a deeper-rooted concept that
goes beyond those approaches, based on a cognitive concept that looks into how
groups of people perceive things and how this perception can be explained and to
some extend predicted, as well as modiﬁed. A general assumption of cultural
approaches is that the perception of (in)security depends on culturally embedded
meanings of risk. For example, immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of
social radicalization processes that mount up to threats to internal security; differently, a user security culture may be interpreted as a social ﬁrewall against IT security
offenses. A further relevant aspect of security culture is the cultural selection of risks.
Different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing worldviews (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, see above), as they tend to be
paramount in multicultural cities.
Risk research has shown that people’s assessment of risks and threats greatly
depends on knowledge of precedents, frequency, and extent of risk experience as
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well as perceived immediate effects on themselves (Kahneman et al. 1982). From
those ﬁndings as well, important conclusions can be drawn for the COVID-19
pandemic response: For instance, as relates to a shift in public risk perception and
resulting behavioral dispositions (Qin et al. 2021) or the challenge of basing
mitigation strategies on evolving probabilistic information or on the role that social,
political, and institutional rituals can play in enhancing or obstructing pandemic
response effectiveness (Brown 2020).
Understanding, and building into research designs as well as policy recommendations emanating from security science research, risk perception constitutes an
ELSI challenge of continuing and all-hazards relevance. For example, Coppola
(2007, pp. 164–166) distinguished between fear-related and knowledge-related
factors or risk perception and associated risk-taking behavior:
• Fear-related factors:
– Risks causing pain and death are generally feared
– Controllable risks tend to be feared less than uncontrollable risks
– Disasters with global impacts are feared more than those with regional impacts
– Lethal risks are feared more
– Risks equal to all population groups are feared less than risks affecting
particular sub-groups (especially children)
– Collective risks are feared more than individual risks
– Risks exceeding life spans are more alarming
– Risks that are hard to prevent cause greater fear
– Decreasing risks (e.g., due to effective mitigation) are feared less
– Involuntary risks are feared more
– Direct affection raises fear of risk
– Avoidable risks cause less fear
• Knowledge-related factors:
– Invisible risks (e.g., smoke vs. genetic engineering)
– Risks with an unknown degree of exposure
– Risks having delayed effects
– New/unknown risks
– Scientiﬁcally implausible risks
Further related to ELSI, as shown in Table 1, the World Health Organization
pointed out that the perception of risk and resulting planning requirements to a
considerable extent do not only depend on human mechanisms for processing
information but also on social and cultural values (WHO 2005, pp. 110–111; for
an in-depth discussion see Ammann 2006).
An interesting domain to illustrate how ELSI can be addressed proactively in the
planning stage using different public participation methods is urban planning, with a
focus on safe and secure – while open and livable – public spaces. Table 2 includes
some well-tested and established methods, along with references to the Urban
Securipedia open-access knowledge base (https://securipedia.eu), where those
methods and their application are explained. Those methods are not restricted to
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Table 1 Factors that affect people’s perception of risk and risk-taking behavior, according to the
World Health Organization (WHO)
Factor
Voluntariness

Controllability

Familiarity

Fairness

Beneﬁts

Catastrophic
potential

Understanding

Uncertainty

Effects on children

Victim identity

Dread

Description with examples
Risks from activities considered to be involuntary or imposed (e.g.,
exposure to chemicals and radiation from a terrorist attack using
chemical weapons or dirty bombs) are judged to be greater and are,
therefore, less readily accepted than risks from voluntary activities (such
as smoking, sunbathing, or mountain climbing)
Risks from activities considered to be under the control of others (such
as the release of nerve gas in a coordinated series of terrorist attacks) are
judged to be greater and are less readily accepted than those from
activities considered to be under the control of the individual (such as
driving an automobile or riding a bicycle)
Risks resulting from activities viewed as unfamiliar (such as travel
leading to exposure to exotic-sounding infectious diseases) are judged
greater than risks resulting from activities viewed as familiar (such as
household work)
Risks from activities believed to be unfair or to involve unfair processes
(such as inequities in the location of medical facilities) are judged greater
than risks from “fair” activities (such as widespread vaccinations)
Risks from activities that seem to have unclear, questionable, or diffused
personal or economic beneﬁts (e.g., proximity to waste-disposal
facilities) are judged to be greater than risks resulting from activities with
clear beneﬁts (e.g., employment or automobile driving)
Risks from activities associated with potentially high numbers of deaths
and injuries grouped in time and space (e.g., major terrorist attacks using
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons) are judged to be greater than
risks from activities that cause deaths and injuries scattered (often
apparently randomly) in time and space (e.g., household accidents)
Poorly understood risks (such as the health effects of long-term exposure
to low doses of toxic chemicals or radiation) are judged to be greater than
risks that are well understood or self-explanatory (such as pedestrian
accidents or slipping on ice)
Risks that are relatively unknown or highly uncertain (such as those
associated with genetic engineering) are judged to be greater than risks
from activities that appear to be relatively well known to science (such as
actuarial risk data related to automobile accidents)
Activities that appear to put children speciﬁcally at risk (such as drinking
milk contaminated with radiation or toxic chemicals or pregnant women
exposed to radiation or toxic chemicals) are judged to carry greater risks
than more-general activities (such as employment)
Risks from activities that produce identiﬁable victims (such as an
individual worker exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals or radiation,
or children involved in accidents or terrorist attacks) are judged to be
greater than risks from activities that produce statistical victim proﬁles
(such as automobile accidents)
Risks from activities that evoke fear, terror, or anxiety due to the horriﬁc
consequences of exposure (e.g., to certain infectious diseases, radiation
sickness, or cancer) are judged to be greater than risks from activities not
arousing such emotions (e.g., to common colds or household accidents)
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Factor
Trust

Media attention

Accident history

Reversibility

Personal stake

Ethical and moral
status

Human versus
natural origin

Description with examples
Risks from activities associated with individuals, institutions, or
organizations lacking in trust and credibility (e.g., chemical companies
or nuclear power plants with poor safety records) are judged to be greater
than risks from activities associated with trustworthy and credible
sources (e.g., regulatory agencies that achieve high levels of compliance
from regulated industries)
Risks from activities that generate considerable media attention (such as
anthrax attacks using the postal system or accidents at nuclear power
plants) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that generate
little media attention (such as occupational accidents)
Activities with a history of major accidents or incidents as well as
frequent minor accidents or incidents (such as leaks from waste-disposal
facilities) are judged to carry greater risks than activities with little or no
such history (such as recombinant DNA experimentation)
The risks of potentially irreversible adverse effects (such as birth defects
from exposure to a toxic substance or radiation) are judged to be greater
than risks considered to be reversible (e.g., sports injuries)
Activities viewed as placing people or their families personally and
directly at risk (such as living near a waste-disposal site) are judged to
carry greater risks than activities that appear to pose no direct or personal
threat (such as the disposal of waste in remote areas)
Risks from activities believed to be ethically objectionable or morally
wrong (such as providing diluted or outdated vaccines for an
economically distressed community) are judged to be greater than the
risks from ethically neutral activities (such as the side effects of
medication)
Risks generated by human action, failure, or incompetence (such as
negligence, inadequate safeguards, or operator error) are judged to be
greater than risks believed to be caused by nature or “acts of god”

Source: WHO (2005, pp. 110–111), with adaptations

addressing the liberty vs. security/safety continuum in urban planning but are also
applicable to other domains to ensure ELSI integration into security strategies and
policies.
Legal aspects in security science speciﬁcally concern, but are not limited to,
compliance issues in the research process itself. They also relate to the integration,
typical of the homeland security era, of broad security aspects into the legal and
political system in a socially feasible and ethically acceptable manner. This includes
proper consideration of the impact of new security-related legislation on the public
and private sectors (Anikeeff et al. 2003). A well-balanced consideration of ELSI
further is relevant to avoid a legalist bias in security science and to the use of security
science ﬁndings in practical decision-making. Using homeland security in the USA
as an example, some of its critics argue that constitutional and legal considerations
have sometimes prevailed over focused analyses of vulnerability gaps and development of new requirements for more efﬁcient and effective security measures
(cf. Beckman 2007). ELSI analysis can provide a context for placing relevant legal
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Table 2 Public participation methods to integrate different ethical, legal, and social aspects into
security considerations in the strategic planning of safe and secure public spaces
Public
participation
method
Activating
Opinion Survey

Advocacy
Planning

Citizen Jury

Cooperative
Discourse

Dynamic
Facilitation

Experimental
Participation
Method

Focus Group

Short explanation
Asks people about their views and attitudes;
at the same time, encourages them to
articulate and defend their interests and to
contribute to solutions
Typically used at a regional or local level to
appraise underrepresented segments of the
population about planning issues and to
involve them in developing suggestions to
revolve contentious issues
Using their everyday experience and
knowledge, randomly selected members of
the general public work together to produce
an interest-free citizen assessment of a
particular, often contentious, issue
Supports complex, conﬂictual decisionmaking processes combining different
methods, such as mediation or Delphi
survey; starts with participants from the
affected communities developing criteria to
assess different strategic/planning options;
participants are then encouraged to actively
bring their interests to the table in a
mediation session; subsequently, experts
analyze the decision alternatives identiﬁed
by participants; ﬁnally, participants evaluate
the options using their criteria set developed
in the ﬁrst step of the process, and
recommend one alternative
This is a guided open group discussion,
specially used to address emotionally loaded
issues; participants are encouraged to be
creative in exploring possible solutions,
while also developing mutual trust
Series of professionally coordinated and
facilitated meetings that serve as a link
between decision-makers and those who will
be affected by the decision; helps to improve
problem awareness on both sides and can
lead to discussion-driven consensus, with
recommendations adopted by the relevant
public sector agency/agencies
Framework for multistep, increasingly
focusing deliberation on a speciﬁc issue in a
goal-oriented fashion way, while also
encouraging expression and addressing of
emotion as well as group-dynamic processes

Urban Securipedia page
https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Activating_opinion_surve
https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Advocacy_planning

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Citizen_jury

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Cooperative_Discourse

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Dynamic_Facilitation

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Experimental_participation_
method

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Focus_group

(continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
Public
participation
method
Future
Workshop
Local Open
Dialogue

Neosocratic
Dialogue

Participatory
Diagnosis

Planning for
Real

Safety Audit

Short explanation
Dialogue-based micro-democratic processes
to develop and test new ideas to solve
common or shared problems
A set of different methods to improve risk
communication, perception, and assessment
through whole-community involvement;
among other things, it may include
roundtables (bringing representatives of
different or segregated groups together that
are affected by the same problem), citizen
exhibitions (linguistic and visual expressions
of those affected by a certain planning
decision to create a fair discussion platform),
or future workshops (see above)
A framework to address universal questions
as involved in the planning/strategic
decisions at stake with members of the
public; this is then connected to participants’
experience related to the underlying issues to
establish a basis for further analysis
responsive to the public’s concerns and needs
A moderated small-group setting in which
affected members of the public members
discuss their most important questions or
concerns about an issue/planning subject
matter that is becoming ripe for decision
making; a focus is on the expected impact on
daily life and routines; based on this, priority
topics are identiﬁed for subsequent research/
policy analysis to support decision-making
A community-oriented planning approach
designed to activate people; based on a
stepwise interactive process with different
participation and interaction opportunities to
overcome communication obstacles and
identify existing (community) resources
Originally designed by the Metropolitan
Action Committee on Violence Against
Women and Children (METRAC), uses
diverse, whole-community discussion
groups to review public safety concerns and
makes recommendations to local
government

Urban Securipedia page
https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Future_Workshop
https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/Local_
open_dialogue

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Neosocratic_Dialogue

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Participatory_Diagnosis

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Planning_for_Real

https://securipedia.eu/
mediawiki/index.php/
Safety_audit

foundations and compliance measures into the social context of the society whose
values and way of life science and security interventions are meant to protect.
Security always must be weighed against other values, such as liberty, freedom,
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and privacy rights – but also accountability and freedom of discussion (Rosenzweig
et al. 2012).
Another pertinent example of legal aspects within ELSI relates to civil rights in
emergency management. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA
2021) published a Community Vaccination Centers Playbook that includes an
annex on “Civil Rights Considerations During COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution
Efforts.” Civil rights considerations follow a checklist provided by FEMA’s Ofﬁce
of Equal Rights (OER). The steps to ensure vaccine distributive justice for example
include, but are not limited to:
• Identifying communities with limited English proﬁciency and languages needed
for disseminating vaccination information
• Identifying, and assisting, communities with public transportation and functional
needs to reach a vaccination center
• Identifying communities with internet access needs
• Organizing events to engage (with) communities without internet adaption or
reliable internet access
• Addressing public concerns over vaccination site selection and accessibility
• Addressing people’s religious and safety concerns
• Managing vaccination site compliance with legal accessibility requirements, such
as following the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in the USA
As this selection of examples of ELSI aspects demonstrates, the “E,” “L,” and “S”
dimensions intersect. ELSI assessment in security science therefore should follow a
comprehensive approach, as laid out in the subsequent section.

The Need for a Comprehensive Approach
There is more than the societal dimension of security, namely: the societal creation
of security. The societal creation of security starts with a whole-community approach
to vulnerability that includes ELSI aspects in vulnerability analysis and also considers vulnerable and protectable social infrastructure in addition to physical and
institutional infrastructure (Cannon 2006). The interaction of anthropogenic systems
with nature and natural hazards needs more thorough addressing by security science,
whose projects and endorsements for a certain practice must increasingly consider
societal impact, through proactive ESLI analysis. Critical thinking about the role of
political privileged scientiﬁc advice in the context of the COVID-19 catastrophe has
been demonstrated how ever more important this is in the present time (Brown
2020).
Here lies a problem with “science” or “data-driven” approaches to COVID-19
responses that many countries claim to follow (Siedschlag 2020). Typically, those
approaches to the novel coronavirus pandemic almost exclusively focus on
healthcare sector protection and preventing it, at seemingly almost any risked
price, from demand overload. We know there is a tendency of risk avoidance (as
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opposed to risk management) in the public health sector and also in public health
sciences, as bioethics have criticized (Royo-Bordonada and Román-Maestre 2015).
As the disaster ethics paradigm (Zack 2009) would posit, the “common good”
(Rousseau’s concept of what brings beneﬁt to all of society) cannot be determined
by realized in such an approach that neglects the needs of the entire rest of the whole
community. Moreover, a public health metrics-focused data-driven approach to the
COVID-19 response is limited. One shortcoming is that only pandemic data and
projections appear to be used, with no adequately comprehensive set of indicators
applied (cf. Wardman and Lofstedt 2020). Such a set would include, among others,
social life data such as “social vulnerability” (Cannon et al. 2003).
More generally, reﬂecting the cross-border and cross-sector nature of current and
emerging security threats and challenges, as well as the complexity of instruments
and objectives in security policies and strategies, a comprehensive approach is
needed to anticipate and effectively address ethical, legal, and social (ELSI) implications. The focus should be on recognizing and solving the actual security needs of
the population, not only on mitigating the impacts of security interventions on public
life. Integrated risk assessment (Ammann 2006), as discussed above, is one part of
it. A comprehensive approach to security science and good societal security practice
cognizant of security science discoveries should consider and address the public in
an inclusive way, integrating people’s perspectives into the research process, into the
programming of security science itself, as well as into policies and strategies derived
from security science discoveries (Rykkja 2018).
Security science should offer advice to authorities to make appropriate trade-offs
between security and other valued societal objectives, while its research projects
should make a well-deﬁned and tangible contribution to the development of security
science as a practically relevant discipline. The following example from the cybersecurity domain illustrates this postulation:
Since an increasing amount of health testing and monitoring is carried out
digitally, a trend boosted by COVID-19, the security of e-health systems will be
important to both governments and populations around the world. This might be a
point of vulnerability to hostile attacks or a sort of blackmail of governments. In such
cases, vulnerability is known to be reduced if numbers of networks are multiplied,
but this is at the cost of interoperability. Research on the trade-offs between uniﬁed
digital systems and vulnerability to cyberattacks will have ethical aspects, since less
unity might in principle have a health cost, for example when medical records are
inaccessible between regions as patients travel.
Moreover, addressing aspects of ethics is not only a requirement for good
research. It is also of high importance for public perception of the scholastic integrity
and societal impact of security science research. Addressing those aspects thus
contributes to the social legitimacy of its scientiﬁc efforts, as well as society’s
acceptance and use of its results and products. There is a tendency to address ethical,
legal, and broader sociocultural aspects of security and related scientiﬁc research via
normative means: by enacting policies and procedures that reduce the risk of
negative ethical and societal impacts. Security is a collective good that relates
above all to society as a whole (Wolfers 1952). Without public acceptance and the
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inclusion of the whole community in the creation of security and the “production” of
solutions to security problems, such outcomes will be considerably limited in their
effectiveness (Friedewald et al. 2017). As knowledge about how science works can
increase public acceptance of its results and technological solutions (Weisberg et al.
2021), broad communication about ELSI integration into the research process in the
ﬁeld of security science can support its informed societal approval.
A recent example is the National Security Interim Strategic Guidance issued by
President Biden in March 2021 that calls for a comprehensive approach with ELSI
integration into the policy-making cycle:
Because traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic policy – and among national
security, economic security, health security, and environmental security – are less meaningful than ever before, we will reform and rethink our agencies, departments, interagency
processes, and White House organization to reﬂect this new reality. We will ensure that
individuals with expertise in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, economics
and ﬁnance, and critical languages and regions are fully integrated into our decision-making.
Because the federal government does not, and never will, have a monopoly on expertise, we
will develop new processes and partnerships to ensure that state, municipal, tribal, civil
society, non-proﬁt, diaspora, faith-based, and private sector actors are better integrated into
policy deliberations. And we will develop new mechanisms to coordinate policy and
implementation across this diverse set of stakeholders. (The White House 2021, p. 22)

The public planning participation methods assembled in Table 2 above provide some
examples of how such integration of ELSI aspects into the national security policymaking cycle could be practically accomplished. However, ﬁtting “expertise in
science,” as per the National Security Interim Strategic Guidance, into decisionmaking ﬁrst should not be conﬁned to the natural sciences and second poses its own
speciﬁc challenges and creates dilemmas that political culture, prudence, and selfrestraint will be better able to tackle than would the scientiﬁc construction of policy.

Dilemmas of Security Science in Practice
Adopting a security measure just because there is “science” that supports the
measure works does not meet ELSI standards. Ethics and social issues consideration,
as also demonstrated by COVID-19 responses and their criticism (Collins et al.
2020; Greer et al. 2020; Maor and Howlett 2020), still must achieve a balance
between idealist behaviorism and realism. Idealist behaviorism was laid out by
Charles Merriam, who also served as an advisor to several US presidents, in his
New Aspects of Politics (Merriam 1925). Merriam had argued that political reasoning can be directly improved by improving methods of related research. Merriam
advocated “politics as the science of constructive, intelligent social control,” based
on a well civics-educated rational public (Merriam 1925, p. 10). Hence, in this
perspective, political decision-making should be based on scientiﬁc insight and crisis
management should exert scholarly informed intelligent social control.
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Arguing against Merriam and others, Hans J. Morgenthau (1947), in Scientiﬁc
Man vs. Power Politics, explained how an emphasis on science and reason as routes
to peace – and crisis and disaster management may be included – can have nations
lose touch with their historic traditions of statecraft. As Morgenthau pointed out,
science deals with probabilities but politics require prudent leadership. Morgenthau
(1947, p. vi) argued that “belief in the redeeming powers of science” does not
exempt the political leader from making the difﬁcult choice of the lesser evil.
Good security science conscious of ELSI hence should:
• Be based on the understanding that security mainly refers to people and society,
and that technical solutions are not effective without the acceptance and participation of the public
• Include advice to authorities to make appropriate trade-offs between security and
other valued societal objectives
• Make a well-deﬁned and tangible contribution to the evolution of security science
as a societally relevant discipline
• Promote critical discussion of fundamental concepts – whether established or
innovative and their societal impact
• Consider signiﬁcant social, cultural, ethical, legal, and political aspects of security
from the very beginning of the research and development activities, that is, not
only in the implementation and in terms of public acceptance and ascribed
legitimacy of research results and products
• Strengthen – especially against the backdrop of resilience – a whole-of-community and ownership approach to security
• Act as a socialization vector that builds resilience clusters, which wherever
possible comprise technology/capability, ﬁrst responders, and members of the
general public
• Involve a track dedicated to quick response mechanisms for managing social
stress resulting from interruption of supplies
• Strongly consider that new technological environments should support the selfhelp capacity of the general public and that new technologies can change the
structure and perception of crises and their management
• Recognize that its technological innovations may also cause new societal vulnerabilities, or create different and unfair levels of security in society
• Make a speciﬁc contribution to the knowledge pool of the implementing organization(s) and the building of sustainable excellence of research and expertise,
operational and effective beyond project lifetime
• Contribute to establishing institutionalized relations between those actors
involved in realizing societal security
As discussed, ELSI considerations should also thoroughly inform risk and vulnerability assessment. By identifying vulnerabilities comprehensively, following an
ELSI evaluation, security science can directly contribute to the strengthening of
community resilience. In doing so, security science should follow a comprehensive
approach to vulnerability, with a focus on social vulnerability:
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In order to understand how people are affected by disasters, it is clearly not enough to
understand only the hazards themselves. Disasters happen when a natural phenomenon
affects a population that is inadequately prepared and unable to recover without external
assistance. But the hazard must impact on groups of people that are at different levels of
preparedness (either by accident or design), resilience, and with varying capacities for
recovery. Vulnerability is the term used to describe the condition of such people. It involves
much more than the likelihood of their being injured or killed by a particular hazard, and
includes the type of livelihoods people engage in, and the impact of different hazards
on them.
It is especially important to recognise this social vulnerability as much more than the
likelihood of buildings to collapse or infrastructure to be damaged. It is crucially about the
characteristics of people, and the differential impacts on people of damage to physical
structures. Social vulnerability is the complex set of characteristics that include a person’s
• initial well-being (nutritional status, physical and mental health, morale;
• livelihood and resilience (asset pattern and capitals, income and exchange options,
qualiﬁcations;
• self-protection (the degree of protection afforded by capability and willingness to build
safe home, use safe site)
• social protection (forms of hazard preparedness provided by society more generally,
e.g. building codes, mitigation measures, shelters, preparedness);
• social and political networks and institutions (social capital, but also role of institutional
environment in setting good conditions for hazard precautions, peoples’ rights to express
needs and of access to preparedness). (Cannon et al. 2003, pp. 4–5)

For example, technological innovation and the further spread of networked
structures will create new vulnerabilities, which will require increased societal
awareness and resilience. Technology not only contributes to security but can by
itself create new vulnerabilities. Technology also has the potential to change human
behavior and to drive the evolution of security cultures. Public concern about being
controlled by technology may change people’s behavior. At the same time, it may
bring a new impetus for community activities, such as crowdsourcing of information
about hazards and disasters to support prevention, protection, mitigation, response,
and recovery. As those examples indicate, the development and application of
technology do not create security or new vulnerabilities out of the blue; rather,
they – for example by providing frames – accentuate existing trends, processes,
and repertoires of action that are socially rooted and connected to common values
(Peterson 1991). Social networks play an increasingly important role in information
dissemination, opinion-mining, and public decision-making. The unstructured and
informal nature of social networks is a challenge for state authorities, which traditionally operate in a linear, top-down manner. This clash of cultures requires new
procedures and training schemes for civil servants, ofﬁcials, and volunteers. This is a
signiﬁcant dimension in the societal creation of security. There are no effective
technological solutions without acceptance and public participation. With internal
and external security becoming less and less separable in a variety of sectors, the
public will have to be better involved in security processes.
At the same time, the further development of civil security cannot be conceived
without technology, and technology will contribute to increasing societal resilience.
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Another aspect is natural hazards and disasters. The risk they pose is co-deﬁned by
prevailing social conditions. Climate change to COVID-19 have taught us that the
interaction of anthropogenic systems with nature and natural hazards need more
thorough and more anticipatory addressing by security science.
With the dependency of society on critical infrastructure increasing, the complexity of the social consequences of critical infrastructure failure increases as well.
Public entities and nations as a whole may be called on to assume security roles that
focus on managing the social consequences of critical infrastructure breakdown.
However, those possible future public roles will have their limitations in that
people’s crisis behavior considerably depends on predominant social patterns, security cultures, as well as the civic culture at large. This includes the perceived
legitimacy of political, economic, and social institutions and the level of risk
tolerance of the population as aspects of societal resilience.

Conclusion
As a universal, transdisciplinary, and whole-community enterprise, the output of
security science must be planned for beyond the traditional research results utility
criteria of advisory board pleasure, grant project ofﬁcers’ delight, and end-user
satisfaction. It should anticipate and meet societal requirements and stimulate future
demand, thus contributing to establish its own benchmarks instead of just meeting
preset conventional standards.
Security itself does and will continue to play a role in a variety of discourses, but
it remains a vague term that is under constant change. Therefore, security science
should increasingly include perspectives from the humanities and social sciences to
provide practical criticism of the evolution of the concept of security in different
geographies, their cultures, and its impact on citizens and society. Security science
should also provide a better connection of the disciplines involved in its research
undertakings. It should establish networked expertise to foster deliberate planning as
well as rapid decision support capability for crisis management. To meet growing
ELSI expectations, security science should provide an analysis of societal security
needs. It should also help make fair and sustainable trade-offs between security and
other valued societal objectives.
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A. Jerković and A. Siedschlag

Lucivero F (2016) Ethical assessments of emerging technologies. Appraising the moral plausibility
of technological visions. Springer, Heidelberg et al
Maor M, Howlett M (2020) Explaining variations in state COVID-19 responses. Psychological,
institutional, and strategic factors in governance and public policy-making. Policy Des Practice
3(3):228–241. https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2020.1824379
Merriam C (1925) New aspects of politics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Morgenthau HJ (1947) Scientiﬁc man vs. power politics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Nyman J, Burke A (eds) (2016) Ethical security studies. A new research agenda. Routledge,
New York
Paton D, Johnston D (2017) Disaster resilience. An integrated approach, 2nd edn. Thomas,
Springﬁeld
Peterson RT (1991) Technology, culture, and democratic politics. Centen Rev 35(1):31–49. http://
www.jstor.org/stable/23740252. Accessed 23 Feb 2021
Qin H, Sanders C, Prasetyo Y (2021) Dynamic risk perception and behavior in response to the
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID 19). In: Natural Hazards Center quick response grant report
series, 317. Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado Boulder. https://hazards.colorado.
edu/quick-response-report/dynamic-risk-perception-and-behavior-in-response-to-the-coronavi
rus-disease-2019-covid-19. Accessed 7 Mar 2021
Rath J, Ischi M, Perkins D (2014) Evolution of different dual-use concepts in international and
national law and its implications on research ethics and governance. Sci Eng Ethics 20(3):769–
790. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-014-9519-y
Roach K, Hufnagel S (eds) (2012) Emergency law. Routledge, New York
Roberts PS (2013) Disasters and the American state. How politicians, bureaucrats, and the public
prepare for the unexpected. Cambridge University Press, New York
Rosenzweig P, McNulty TJ, Shearer E (eds) (2012) National security law in the news. American Bar
Association, Chicago
Royo-Bordonada MA, Román-Maestre B (2015) Towards public health ethics. Public Health Rev
36(3). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40985-015-0005-0
Rykkja LH (2018) Societal security and crisis management. Governance capacity and legitimacy.
Springer International Publishing, Cham
Selgelid MJ, Viens AM (eds) (2012) Emergency ethics. Ashgate, Farnham
Siedschlag A (2017) Ethical, legal, and social issues in homeland security. What they are and how to
address them. In: Alperen MJ (ed) Foundations of homeland security. Law and policy, 2nd edn.
Wiley, Hoboken, pp 29–54. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119289142.ch3
Siedschlag A (2020) Pennsylvania’s COVID-19 response vs. homeland security frameworks and
research. Masking the whole community. Homel Secur Affairs 16(Article 10). http://www.hsaj.
org/articles16350. Accessed 7 Mar 2021
Siedschlag A, Jerković A (eds) (2018) Homeland security cultures. Enhancing values while
fostering resilience. Rowman & Littleﬁeld International, Lanham
Suchman L, Follis K, Weber J (2017) Tracking and targeting. Sociotechnologies of (in)security. Sci
Technol Hum Values 42(6):9831002. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243917731524
The White House (2021) National security interim strategic guidance. https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. Accessed 7 Mar 2021
Wardman JK, Lofstedt, R (eds) (2020) COVID-19 Special Issue. J Risk Res 23(7–8). https://www.
tandfonline.com/toc/rjrr20/23/7-8. Accessed 7 Mar 2021
Weber M (1962) Basic concepts in sociology (trans: Secher HP). Philosophical Library, New York
Weisberg DS, Landrum AR, Hamilton J, Weisberg M (2021) Knowledge about the nature of science
increases public acceptance of science regardless of identity factors. Public Underst Sci 30(2):
120–138. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662520977700

Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI)

19

Wolfers A (1952) “National security” as an ambiguous symbol. Polit Sci Q 67:481–502
World Health Organization (WHO) (2005) Effective media communication during public health
emergencies. A WHO handbook. World Health Organisation, Geneva. http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/WHO%20MEDIA%20HANDBOOK.pdf. Accessed 10 Mar 21
Yesley MS, Roth MRJ (comp) (1993) ELSI bibliography. Ethical, legal & social implications of the
human genome project. U.S. Department of Energy, Ofﬁce of Energy Research. https://doi.org/
10.2172/10108311
Zack N (2009) Ethics for disaster. Rowman & Littleﬁeld, Lanham

